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Abstract—This work studies a beamforming design for down-
link transmission of a multi-user multiple-input single-output
(MISO) system where each legitimate user employs a power
splitting (PS) based simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT) technique. The transmitter intends to send
confidential information to its legitimate users in the presence
of purely unknown eavesdroppers. Since the transmitter does
not have any knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ channel state
information (CSI), we consider an artificial noise (AN) approach
to establishing secure communication. This beamforming design
is developed by maximizing the AN power to interfere with the
eavesdropper as much as possible. Based on the assumption of
imperfect CSI of legitimate users at the transmitter, two robust
design approaches for the joint beamforming and PS ratio have
been studied to maximize the AN power under both energy
harvesting (EH) and signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
requirements at each legitimate user. In the first robust design,
we consider the bounded channel uncertainties, and employ
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and a linear matrix inequality
(LMI) representation to transform the original problem into a
semidefinite program (SDP). In the second robust design, we
consider the statistical channel uncertainties, and show that the
proposed problem can be reformulated into another form of SDP
through both SDR and Bernstein-type inequality. In addition, the
non-linear energy harvesting (EH) model is incorporated in this
work as it could reflect the characteristics of practical radio
frequency(RF)-EH conversion circuit. Simulation results have
been provided to demonstrate the performance of our proposed
robust designs.
Index Terms—SWIPT, power splitting, non-linear energy har-
vesting, robust design, convex optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) has been recognized as a promising solution to trans-
mit information and energy to incorporated wireless devices. In
addition, SWIPT has been considered as a potential technique
to extend the battery lifetime of wireless networks, especially in
wireless sensor networks and Internet of Things (IoT) [1], [2]. In
contrast to the conventional energy harvesting techniques which
extract energy from natural energy sources such as solar and wind,
SWIPT can be easily implemented on wireless devices [3]–[5] by
exploiting the radio frequency (RF) signals [6], [7]. In a SWIPT
system, the receivers can perform both information decoding
(ID) and energy harvesting (EH) simultaneously [2]. However,
SWIPT systems are more vulnerable against eavesdropping, due
to the fact that the energy receivers can perform both EH and
decoding the confidential information intended for legitimate
users [8]. Recently, information theoretic based physical layer
security techniques have received a considerable attention in
enhancing security in SWIPT systems [4], [5], [9], [10]. Unlike
conventional cryptographic techniques that completely rely on
the computational complexity of some mathematical problems
[11]–[13], physical layer security techniques are developed by
exploiting physical layer characteristics of wireless channels [14]–
[20]. In SWIPT systems, an artificial noise (AN) approach can
be utilized to degrade the interception capability of energy re-
ceivers while increasing the amount of harvested energy. The AN
aided beamforming designs for establishing secure transmission
in SWIPT systems have been studied in [3], [8], [21], [22].
Most existing works that adopt the linear EH model assume
that the output direct current (DC) power is independent of the
input power. However, in practice, the EH circuit results in a
non-linear power conversion due to the rectifier in the RF-EH
conversion circuit which is the key element in wireless power
transfer implementation [23]. Therefore, the assumption of a linear
EH model in the literature may not be able to incorporate the non-
linear characteristics in practical EH scenarios [24]. Recently, the
practical parametric non-linear EH model has been considered
in [24]. In contrast to the linear EH model, the non-linear one
includes the characteristics of practical RF-EH conversion circuits.
A power allocation strategy for a SWIPT system with non-linear
EH model is proposed in [24], whereas EH maximization is
investigated with a non-linear EH model for multiple antenna
systems in [2], [25]–[28].
In most existing works on secure transmission schemes, it is
assumed that the transmitter has perfect or partial knowledge of
the eavesdropper’s CSI [2], [3], [8], [29], [30]. However, it is
not always possible to obtain the eavesdropper’s CSI in practical
scenarios, for example, the eavesdroppers might be purely passive
during some transmissions. Most recently, robust beamforming
designs with unknown eavesdroppers have been studied in [31],
[32], where the power of AN or jamming signal is maximized to
confuse the unknown eavesdroppers as much as possible under
the QoS requirement at the legitimate user.
Motivated by the aforementioned aspects, we consider a MISO
secure SWIPT system with power splitting (PS) in this paper,
where the transmitter and legitimate users are equipped with
multiple and single antennas, respectively. It is assumed that
all the legitimate users can simultaneously process information
decoding and energy harvesting. A non-linear EH model is
adopted in the legitimate users to capture the characteristics of
practical EH circuits. In addition, it is assumed that all the
eavesdroppers are purely passive, hence their CSI is not available
at the transmitter, and we exploit AN to mask the signal intended
for the legitimate users. In this work, our aim is to maximize
the power of AN to confuse the unknown eavesdroppers while
satisfying quality of service and EH requirements at the legitimate
users. We develop two robust joint beamforming and PS designs
with the AN approach: (1) For the bounded channel uncertainties,
we show that the problem can be transformed as a semidefinite
program (SDP) through semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and a linear
matrix inequality representation; (2) For the statistical channel
uncertainties, we exploit both SDR and Bernstein-type inequality
to reformulate the original problem into another SDP.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The system
model is presented in Section II, whereas the two robust joint
beamforming and PS designs are developed in Section III. Section
IV provides simulation results to validate the effectiveness of our
proposed designs and finally Section V concludes this paper.
A. Notations
We use the upper and lower case boldface letters for matrices
and vectors, respectively. (·)−1, (·)T and (·)H stand for inverse,
transpose and conjugate transpose operation, respectively. A  0
means that A is a positive semidefinite matrix. ||A|| represents
the Euclidean norm of matrix A. The rank(A) and tr(A) denotes
the rank and the trace of matrix A, respectively. The circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) distribution is represented
by CN (µ, σ2) with mean µ and variance σ2. HN denotes the set
of all N ×N Hermitian matrices. Re(·) extracts the real part of
a complex number, whereas vec(·) denotes the vector by stacking
columns of a matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this work, we consider the downlink transmission of an
AN aided MISO SWIPT system with K legitimate users and J
eavesdroppers as shown in Fig. 1. It is assumed that the legitimate
transmitter is equipped with NT antennas whereas both legitimate
users and eavesdroppers are equipped with single antennas. The
channels between the transmitter and the k-th legitimate user,
and the j-th eavesdropper are denoted as hs,k ∈ CNT×1 and
he,j ∈ CNT×1, respectively. qk ∈ CNT×1 and v ∈ CNT×1
represent the information signal vector and the artificial noise
vector. In addition, the AN vector v follows zero mean complex
Gaussian distribution with covariance matrixV  0. The received
signal at the k-th legitimate user and the j-th eavesdropper can
be expressed as
Fig. 1: A MISO SWIPT system with K single-antenna legitimate
users in the presence of J single-antenna eavesdroppers.
ys,k =
K∑
l=1
hHs,kql + h
H
s,kv + ns,k, (1)
ye,j =
K∑
l=1
hHe,jql + h
H
e,jv + ne,j , (2)
respectively, where ns,k and ne,j are the joint effects of thermal
noise and signal processing noise, respectively, at the k-th le-
gitimate receiver and the j-th eavesdropper, which are modelled
as additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and
variance σ2s,k and σ
2
e,j . By employing PS to handle the received
signal, the received signal at the ID circuit of k-th legitimate user
as can be written as follows:
yIDs,k =
√
ρs,k(
K∑
l=1
hHs,kql + h
H
s,kv + ns.k) + nsp,k, (3)
where ρs,k ∈ (0, 1] denotes the PS factor of the k-th legitimate
user. In addition, nsp,k ∼ CN (0, σ2sp,k) is the noise introduced
by the ID circuit of the k-th legitimate user. The received SINR
at the k-th legitimate receiver and the j-th eavesdroppers can be
written as
Γs,k=
hHs,kqkq
H
k hs,k∑
i6=k h
H
s,kqiq
H
i hs,k + h
H
s,kVhs,k + σ
2
s,k +
σ2
sp,k
ρs,k
, (4)
and
Γe,j =
hHe,jqkq
H
k he,j∑
i6=k h
H
e,jqiq
H
i he,j + h
H
e,jVhe,j + σ
2
e,j
. (5)
On the other hand, the received signal for the EH circuit of the
k-th legitimate user is given by
yEHs,k =
√
1− ρs,k(
K∑
l=1
hHs,kql + h
H
s,kv + ns,k). (6)
The received RF power at the k-th legitimate user can be ex-
pressed as
Pk=ζk(1− ρs,k)(
K∑
l=1
hHs,kqlq
H
l hs,k + h
H
s,kVhs,k + σ
2
s,k),
(7)
where ζk represents the EH efficiency of the k-th legitimate user.
In this paper, we adopt a non-linear parametric EH model, which
means the RF to DC conversion efficiency depends on the input
power level. Then, the output DC power at the k-th legitimate
user can be given by
Ek =
Ψk −MkΩk
1− Ωk , (8)
where Ωk =
1
1+exp(akbk)
, Ψk =
Mk
1+exp(−ak(Pk−bk))
and Mk is
a constant denoting the maximum output DC power at the k-th
legitimate user. The parameter ak is the non-linear charging rate
with the respect to the input power and bk is a minimum turn-on
voltage of the EH circuit based parameter.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
As it is assumed that the eavesdroppers’ CSI is unavailable
at the transmitter, the best approach is to exploit AN to degrade
intercepting capability of eavesdroppers. Our aim is to maximize
the AN power while ensuring the worst-case SINRs and energy
harvesting requirements are satisfied. This design problem to
jointly optimize beamforming vectors and AN covariance matrix
can be mathematically formulated as
max
qk,V,ρs,k
tr(V)
s.t. Γs,k ≥ γ,Ek ≥ E¯s, ∀k,
K∑
l=1
‖ql‖2 + tr(V) ≤ Ptotal,
0 < ρs,k ≤ 1,V  0. (9)
Firstly, we tackle the information beamforming vector qk, by
defining a new rank-one matrix Qk = qkq
H
k . Then the original
problem becomes
max
Qk,V,ρs,k
tr(V) (10a)
s.t.
hHs,kQkhs,k∑
i6=k h
H
s,kQihs,k + h
H
s,kVhs,k + σ
2
s,k +
σ2
sp,k
ρs,k
≥ γ,
(10b)
ζk(1 − ρs,k)(
K∑
l=1
hHs,kQlhs,k + h
H
k Vhk + σ
2
s,k) ≥ ωk,
(10c)
tr(
K∑
l=1
Ql +V) ≤ Ptotal,V  0,Ql  0, ∀l, (10d)
0 < ρs,k ≤ 1, rank(Qk) = 1. (10e)
where ωk represents the required received power under the non-
linear EH model, which is given by
ωk = bk −
ln( Mk
(E¯s+(Mk−E¯s)Ωk
− 1)
ak
. (11)
By employing SDR, we relax problem (10) by dropping the rank
constraint rank(Qk) = 1, the relaxed problem becomes:
max
Qk,V,ρs,k
tr(V)
s.t. (10b)-(10d)
0 < ρs,k ≤ 1. (12)
Proposition 1: Provided that the problem (12) is feasible, the
optimal solution will be always rank-one.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix.
A. Robust Design with Ellipsoidal Channel Uncertainties
In general, it is difficult to for the transmitter to obtain perfect
CSI since channel estimation and quantization always have errors.
As such, we assume that transmitter has imperfect CSI of the
legitimate users. We model this imperfect CSI based on the
deterministic models [27], [32] and the actual channel of the k th
legitimate user can be written as follows:
hs,k = hˆs,k + eˆs,k, (13)
where eˆs,k represents the channel uncertainties. Based on de-
terministic model, the Euclidean norms of channel errors are
bounded by a set of thresholds as
||eˆs,k|| = ||hs,k − hˆs,k|| ≤ ǫs,k, (14)
where ǫs,k ≥ 0 denotes the upper bound of channel uncertainties.
By incorporating these uncertainties, the original problem can be
formulated as the following robust optimization problem:
max
Qk,V,ρs,k
tr(V) (15a)
s.t.(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HQk(hˆs,k + eˆs,k) ≥ γ[
∑
i6=k
(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
H
(Qi +V)(hˆs,k + eˆs,k) + σ
2
s,k + σ
2
sp,k/ρs,k], (15b)
ζ(1 − ρs,k)
[ K∑
l=1
(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
H(Ql +V)(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
+ σ2k
]
≥ ωk, (15c)
tr(
K∑
l=1
Ql +V) ≤ Ptotal, (15d)
0 < ρs,k ≤ 1,V  0,Ql  0, ∀l, (15e)
hs,k = hˆs,k + eˆs,k, ||eˆs,k|| ≤ ǫs,k. (15f)
Then, we remove the channel errors and transform (15b) and (15c)
into linear matrix inequality (LMI) forms. In order to convert
(15b) into QMI form, we first defineWk =
1
γ
Qk−∑i6=kQi−
V, then we employ the following lemma:
Lemma 1: (Schur complement [33]): Let X be a complex
hermitian matrix,
X = XH =
[
B1 B2
BH2 B3
]
. (16)
Thus, B4 = B3 − BH2 B−11 B2 is the Schur complement of B1
in X and the following statements holds: (1) X  0, if and only
if B1  0 and B4  0, (2) if B1  0 then X  0 if and only
if B4  0.
By utilizing Lemma 1, we can rewrite the constraint in (15b)
as the following semidefinite constraint:[
ρs,k σsp,k
σsp,k (hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HWk(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)− σ2s,k
]
 0. (17)
However, this semidefinite constraint in (17) is not convex due
to the channel uncertainties eˆs,k. In order to make this constraint
tractable, we use the following lemma to convert it into LMIs:
Lemma 2: [34] If D  0, then the following QMI[
A1 A2 +A3X
(A2 +A3X)
H A4 +X
HA5 +A
H
5 X+X
HA6X
]
 0,
(18)
∀X : I−XHDX  0, (19)
is equivalent to the following inequality. There exists λ ≥ 0 such
that 
A1 A2 A3AH2 A4 AH5
AH3 A5 A6

− λ

0 0 00 I 0
0 0 −D

  0. (20)
To proceed, we set X = eˆs,k,D = 1/ǫ
2
s,kI,A1 = ρs,k,A2 =
σsp,k,A3 = 01×NT ,A4 = hˆ
H
s,kWkhˆs,k − σs,k,A5 =
Wkhˆs,k,A6 = Wk. Now we rewrite the norm-bounded error
vector eˆs,k, i.e. ||eˆs,k|| ≤ ǫs,k as I − eˆHs,k Iǫ2
s,k
eˆs,k  0,
then adopting Lemma 2, the constraint (17) can be equivalently
expressed as

ρs,k σsp,k 01×NT
σsp,k hˆ
H
s,kWkhˆs,k − σ2s,k − λk hˆHs,kWk
0NT×1 Wkhˆs,k Wk +
λk
ǫ2
s,k
I

  0,
(21)
where λk ≥ 0 is an auxiliary variable. Similarly, defining Mk =∑K
l=1Ql+V and applying Lemma 1, the constraint in (15c) can
be equivalently reformulated as[
ζ(1 − ρs,k) √ωk√
ωk (hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HWk(hˆs,k + eˆs,k) + σ
2
s,k
]
 0.
(22)
By setting X = eˆs,k,D = 1/ǫ
2
s,kI,A1 = ζ(1 − ρs,k),A2 =√
ωk,A3 = 01×NT ,A4 = hˆ
H
s,kMkhˆs,k + σs,k,A5 =
Mkhˆs,k,A6 =Mk and employing Lemma 2, the constraint (22)
can be recast as

ζ(1 − ρs,k) √ωk 01×NT√
ωk hˆ
H
s,kMkhˆs,k + σ
2
s,k − tk hˆHs,kMk
0NT×1 Mkhˆs,k Mk +
ts,k
ǫ2
s,k
I

0,
(23)
where tk ≥ 0 is an auxiliary variable. Hence, the original problem
(15) can be reformulated as
max
Qk,V,ρs,k,λk,tk
tr(V)
s.t. (15d), (15e), (21), (23),
λk ≥ 0, tk ≥ 0. (24)
The problem (24) is convex and can be solved efficiently via CVX
[33].
B. Robust Design with Statistical Channel Uncertainties
We next develop another robust design to handle statistical
channel uncertainties which are modelled as Gaussian random
variables with known statistical distributions. In particular, we
assume that
eˆs,k ∼ CN (0,Θs,k), (25)
whereΘs,k  0 is the given covariance matrix for eˆs,k. Then the
robust problem can be written with statistical channel uncertainties
as
max
Qk,V,ρs,k
tr(V) (26a)
s.t. Prob(Γs,k ≥ γ) ≥ 1− ps,k (26b)
Prob(Ek ≥ E¯s) ≥ 1− qs,k, (26c)
hs,k = hˆs,k + eˆs,k, eˆs,k ∼ CN (0,Θs,k), (26d)
(15d), (15e), (26e)
where ps,k ∈ (0, 1] and qs,k ∈ (0, 1] are the predefined outage
probabilities for the SINR and EH requirements of the k-th
legitimate user, respectively. These thresholds ensure that the k-
th legitimate user is served with a satisfiable SINR and EH no
less than (1 − ps,k) × 100% and (1 − qs,k) × 100% of the
time, respectively. The problem (26) is non-convex due to the
probability constraints in (26a) and (26b) which do not have
closed-form expressions. To circumvent this issue, we adopt the
following lemma:
Lemma 3: (Berstein-type Inequality): Let e ∼ CN (0, In), Q ∈
H
n, r ∈ Cn and s ∈ R, for any 0 < p ≤ 1, we have
Prob{eHQe+ 2Re(eHr) + s ≥ 0} ≥ 1− p, (27)
is equivalent to the following set of convex constraints:
tr(Q)−
√
−2ln(p)t1 + ln(p)t2 + s ≥ 0,∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
vec(Q)√
2r
] ∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ≤ t1,
t2I+Q  0, t2 ≥ 0 (28)
where t1 and t2 are slack variables. We first define the following
equations
Bk = Θ
1
2
s,kWkΘ
1
2
s,k, rk = Θ
1
2
s,kWkhˆs,k, (29)
sk = hˆ
H
s,kWkhˆs,k − σ2s,k − σ2sp,k/ρ, (30)
Ek = Θ
1
2
s,kMkΘ
1
2
s,k,gk = Θ
1
2
s,kMkhˆs,k, (31)
lk = hˆ
H
s,kMkhˆs,k + σ
2
s,k −
ωk
ζ(1− ρk) . (32)
Then, by applying Lemma 3 and Lemma 1, the constraint in (26b)
is equivalent to[
fs,k + hˆ
H
s,kWkhˆs,k − σ2s,k σsp,k
σsp,k ρs,k
]
 0,∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
vec(Bk)√
2rk
] ∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ≤ xs,k,
ys,kI+Bk  0, ys,k ≥ 0, (33)
where fs,k = tr(Bk) −
√−2ln(ps,k)xs,k + ln(ps,k)ys,k. Simi-
larity, the constraint in (26c) can be equivalently written as[
gs,k + hˆ
H
s,kMkhˆs,k + σ
2
s,k
√
ωk√
ωk ζk(1 − ρs,k)
]
 0,∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
vec(Ek)√
2gk
] ∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ms,k,
ns,kI+Ek  0, ns,k ≥ 0, (34)
where gs,k = tr(Ek) −
√−2ln(qs,k)ms,k + ln(qs,k)ns,k. The
statistical channel uncertainty based robust optimization problem
in (26) is reformulated as
max
Qk,V,ρs,k
tr(V)
s.t. (15d), (15e), (33), (34). (35)
The formulation in (35) is a standard SDP and can be solved
efficiently by CVX [33].
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to validate the
performance of our proposed robust schemes. Here, we consider
a wireless communication system with one transmitter and three
legitimate users, where the transmitter is equipped with NT = 4
antennas and all the legitimate users are equipped with single
antenna. It is assumed that all the channel models include both
large scale and small scale fading. The simplified large scale
fading model is given by D = ( d
d0
)−α, where d is the distance
between the transmitter and the receiver, we set d0 = 10m as
the reference distance, and α = 2 as the path loss exponent. We
assume that d1=10 m, d2=14 m and d3 =18 m as the distance
between the transmitter and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd legitimate user,
respectively. We model all the channel coefficients as Rician
fading, which can be expressed as
hˆs,k =
√
KR
1 +KR
hˆLOSs,k +
√
1
1 +KR
hˆNLOSs,k , (36)
where hˆLOSs,k indicates the line of sight (LOS) deterministic com-
ponent with ||hˆLOSs,k ||22 = D, hˆNLOSs,k ∼ CN (0, DI) represents
the Rayleigh fading component. KR is the Rician factor which
is set to be 3. In addition, for the LOS component, we employ
the far-field uniform linear antenna array to model the channels
[35]. For the non-linear EH model, we setM to be 10 dBm which
corresponds to the maximum output DC power. Besides, we adopt
ak = 150 ∀k and bk = 0.024 ∀k as provided in [24], [36]. The
available total transmit power Ptotal is assumed to be 30 dBm.
The EH efficiency ζk is set to be 1. Note that the CSI of the
eavesdroppers is unavailable in both robust designs. To determine
the worst-case SINR for eavesdroppers, we randomly generate
eavesdroppers’ channels in the same way as the legitimate users’
channels, by setting all the distance between the transmitter and
eavesdroppers to 8 m and the number of eavesdroppers J = 2.
For the statistical channel uncertainty based robust design, the
covariance matrices are set to be Ωk = ǫ
2
s,kI, ∀k. In addition,
the SINR and EH outage probability requirements in this design
are set to ps,k = qs,k = 0.1. All the parameters described above
are used in simulations unless specified.
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Fig. 2: Maximum SINR among eavesdroppers versus the SINR
requirement at legitimate users with different antennas and error
bounds for the robust design with ellipsoidal channel uncertainties.
Fig. 2 compares achieved maximum SINR at the eavesdroppers
between the perfect CSI design and robust design with the
ellipsoidal channel uncertainties for different target SINRs and
EH (E¯s = 8 dBm) requirements. As seen in Fig. 2, the largest
SINR at the eavesdroppers increases with the SINR targets and
the error bounds. The design with perfect CSI achieves the least
SINR at the eavesdroppers with the same number of transmit
antennas. Besides, it is obvious that the achievable SINR at the
eavesdroppers can be reduced with large number of transmit
antennas due to more degrees of freedom in the beamforming
design.
Fig. 3 compares achieved maximum SINR at the eavesdroppers
between the perfect CSI design and the robust design with
statistical channel uncertainties for different target SINRs and EH
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Fig. 3: Maximum SINR among eavesdroppers versus the SINR
requirement at legitimate users with different antennas and error
bounds for the robust design with statistical channel uncertainties.
(E¯s = 8 dBm) requirements. As seen in Fig. 3, the largest SINR
at the eavesdroppers increases with the SINR targets and the error
bounds. The design with perfect CSI achieves the least SINR at
the eavesdroppers with the same number of transmit antennas.
Similar to Fig. 2, it is obvious that the achievable SINR at the
eavesdroppers can be reduced by using a large number of transmit
antennas.
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Fig. 4: Non-linear EH model vs linear EH model for robust design
with ellipsoidal channel uncertainties.
Fig. 4 compares non-linear EH model and linear EH model for
robust design with ellipsoidal channel uncertainties. The EH re-
quirement is set to be 8 dBm with the error-bound ǫ2 = 0.01. The
largest SINR at the eavesdroppers increases as EH requirement
increases for both EH models. However, there exists a saturation
point on the EH requirement E¯s in the non-linear EH model, as
seen in Fig. 4, due to the non-linear characteristics of practical
RF-EH conversion circuit. Moreover, for the non-linear EH model,
the EH requirements can be guaranteed only with E¯s < M due
to the maximum output DC power limitation of the practical RF-
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
 Required SINR at legitimate users (dB)
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
M
ax
im
um
 S
IN
R 
at
 E
av
es
 (d
B)
Non-linear EH model
Linear EH model
Fig. 5: Non-linear EH model vs linear EH model for robust design
with statistical channel uncertainties.
EH conversion circuit. On the other hand, adopting the linear EH
model may lead to false output DC power. Hence, employing the
non-linear EH model can reflect the characteristics of the practical
RF-EH conversion circuit. Similar performance is shown in Fig.
5 for the statistical channel uncertainty based robust design with
E¯s = 8 dBm, and ǫ
2 = 0.01.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work studied different robust beamforming designs in an
AN-aided MISO SWIPT system in the presence of multiple purely
passive eavesdroppers. By considering practical non-linear EH
models, we have developed two robust designs based on different
types of channel uncertainties: ellipsoidal and statistically based
channel uncertainties. In the robust design with ellipsoidal uncer-
tainties, we reformulated the original problem as a SDP through
a linear matrix inequality representation. By exploiting both SDR
and Berstein type inequality, we showed that robust design with
statistical channel uncertainties can be recast as another SDP.
Simulation results were provided to demonstrate the performance
of both robust designs. Besides, the performance of the linear
and non-linear EH model have been compared and by adopting
the non-linear EH model can avoid false output power.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
First, we consider the Lagrangian function of problem (12):
L(Qk,V,Zk,Y, α, β, γ, µ)=−tr(V − tr(ZkQk)− tr(YV)
−λk{tr[hs,khHs,k(
Qk
γ
−
∑
i6=k
Qi −V) − σ2s,k − σ2sp,k/ρs,k]}
−µk{tr[hs,khHs,k(
K∑
l=1
Ql +V) + σ
2
s,k]− ωk/[ζ(1− ρs,k)]}
+ α[tr(
K∑
l=1
Ql +V)− Ptotal], (37)
where Zk ∈ HNT+ , Y ∈ HNT+ , λk ∈ R+, µk ∈ R+, α ∈ R+ are
the Lagrangian multipliers associated with problem (12). Then we
derive the corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
[33]:
∂L
∂Qk
= −Zk − (λk/γ + µk)hs,khHs,k + αI = 0, (38)
∂L
∂V
= −I−Y + (λk − µk)hs,khHs,k + αI = 0, (39)
ZkQk = 0,ZK  0,YV = 0,Y  0. (40)
The following equality holds:
(38)-(39) = −Zk + I+Y − λk(1 + 1
γ
)hs,kh
H
s,k = 0, (41)
⇒ Zk = I+Y − λk(1 + 1
γ
)hs,kh
H
s,k, (42)
⇒ {I+Y − λk(1 + 1
γ
)hs,kh
H
s,k}Qk = 0. (43)
Hence, the following rank relation holds:
rank(Qk) = rank
{λk(1 + 1γ )hs,khHs,k
I+Y
Qk
}
≤ rank[λk(1 + 1
γ
)hs,kh
H
s,k] ≤ 1, (44)
which completes the proof of proposition 1.
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